About this measure
Restructure long-term power purchase agreements that require dispatchable plant to run inflexibly, so that contracted plant can reduce output, ramp and cycle with system conditions. In systems with substantial contracted coal- or gas-fired capacity, the largest source of avoidable curtailment is often contractual rather than technical. Take-or-pay provisions, minimum offtake guarantees and payments built around high load factors make it cheaper to curtail renewable generation than to reduce output from a plant physically capable of it. Restructuring can convert energy-based payments to capacity and availability payments, renegotiate minimum offtake and minimum stable load provisions, compensate flexible operation, or shorten or buy out contract terms. Each requires the counterparty to accept revised terms, so the practical route depends on leverage, such as where the state or a state-owned utility is a party, a contract approaches renewal, or a regulatory or fiscal instrument can make flexibility attractive to the generator. Because the alternative is often paying twice, once for contracted output and again for the renewable generation curtailed to accommodate it, the case should be assessed against total system cost rather than contract cost alone. This measure works alongside the flexibility retrofits addressed later in this recommendation; the two are usually needed together.