Why this recommendation matters
The arrangements that govern grid companies were designed for the tasks of an earlier power system era. Revenue models based on cost of service and rate of return were built to protect consumers from monopoly pricing while guaranteeing recovery of prudent investment. Linking grid company revenues to the amount of energy they delivered funded expansion in an era when connecting growing demand was the central task. Mandates were written around reliability and cost. In state-owned systems, the company also served as the public vehicle for electrification and access, directly carrying social objectives. Each of these elements was a reasonable answer to the task of its time.
The tasks of the evolving power system now go beyond what these arrangements reward. Among other new responsibilities, grid companies must increasingly coordinate distributed energy resources, procure flexibility and manage data. Their established tasks are also changing: planning must anticipate electrification, investment decisions have to weigh new operational alternatives, and operations must leverage new digital capabilities to increase utilisation of infrastructure. In this new context, the old governance design produces specific tensions. Returns earned on the asset base favour building over operational solutions. Revenue that rises with energy delivered gives companies reason to resist distributed energy resources and efficiency.
State-owned grid companies have their own specific opportunities and challenges. Such companies can remain a capable public investment vehicle, a natural carrier of public service obligations, and in some systems are freer than a private peer to invest in storage and other alternatives. Still, where the state’s roles as owner, policymaker and regulator blur, obligations can go uncompensated and dividends can compete with investment. In such circumstances, the company can end up financially constrained, just when significant investment is needed to modernise and further develop the grid.
Policy reform has to align what grid companies are required and rewarded to do with what the system needs now. Certain policy reforms already have substantial implementation records: performance-based revenue regulation, cost frameworks that treat operating and capital spending equally, multi-year regulatory periods, state ownership aligned with international standards, and the insulation of system operation from commercial interests. Nevertheless, the reform of grid company governance is an ongoing project. For example, in front-runner markets like the United Kingdom and Australia the regulation of distribution grid companies is still evolving to ensure they serve a more distributed, flexible system. Still, a set of principles has emerged: treating capital and operational spending equally and rewarding performance makes the least-cost option become the commercial one; assigning every grid function supports accountability; and laying out clear obligations and compensation regimes helps grid companies raise the capital they require.
How to act on this recommendation
Stage 1
Assign mandates and functions.
Clarify the roles and responsibilities of all regulated power sector entities. This includes clearly assigning functions related to planning, deployment and operations, with new functions such as the operational coordination of distributed energy resources allocated through transparent rulemaking as they emerge. It also includes embedding explicit transition obligations into the statutes and licences that govern grid companies. Strengthen the ownership and governance of state-owned grid companies with a published ownership policy, independent boards, separated state roles and compensated public service obligations. Grid and energy plans should be published in verifiable form, with assumptions, input data and milestones open to scrutiny.
Stage 2
Realign revenue models.
Introduce output- and performance-based revenue regulation that ties earnings to delivered outcomes. Adopt TOTEX cost treatment so that operating and capital solutions compete on equal terms, with phased implementation where full reform is not yet feasible. Establish multi-year regulatory periods that provide revenue and investment certainty, with clearly defined uncertainty mechanisms to allow adjustment when circumstances change. These frameworks require greater oversight capacity than traditional cost-of-service review, which is addressed in recommendation 7.1.
Stage 3
Insulate system operation from other activities and keep the governance arrangements current.
Insulate system operation from generation, retail and competing service interests through unbundling or independent system operation. Preparations need to begin in earlier stages as this reform can take multiple years. Mandates, performance metrics and incentives should also be revisited on a defined cadence so that governance keeps up as new actors, technologies and functions arrive and scale up.
Core measures
Implementation considerations
Stakeholder interests diverge over who holds responsibility and who carries risk. Governance reform allows grid companies to gain a predictable revenue path and a clearer licence to invest, but it changes what is certain: assured recovery of incurred costs gives way to earnings that depend on containing costs and delivering performance. As such, changes in incentive structures may be contested if they alter established revenue models, redistribute risks or introduce new operational and performance expectations. Clarifying roles can create more resistance where it shifts responsibilities, reduces institutional autonomy or exposes gaps in existing mandates. Grid companies in several jurisdictions have resisted or litigated these reforms, and shareholders, including the state, have resisted where output-based frameworks put earnings at stake. In the case of state-owned grid companies, altering governance can meet its own resistance where it limits uncompensated policy delivery and dividend flexibility. Policymakers and regulators should learn from the experience of front-runners on how to implement these reforms to ensure continued public support. For example, design elements like revisitable baselines and transparent reporting can help avoid poorly benchmarked TOTEX allowances turning into windfall profits. Policymakers should also take care to design mandates and incentives in a way that reinforces system-wide objectives and avoids sending conflicting signals to different institutions and levels of governance. This should protect against incentives that encourage siloed behaviour or lead to unintended outcomes, such as overinvestment in certain assets or underinvestment in flexibility solutions.
Equity considerations centre on what the performance metrics reward and who pays for the change. Performance frameworks deliver what their metrics measure. Metrics chosen without distributional care can unintentionally reward serving profitable customers and areas first. That is why reliability, connection and service metrics should be sufficiently disaggregated to make differences in outcomes visible for rural, low-income and hard-to-serve users. Public service obligations should also continue to have clear funding arrangements to avoid social missions not being fulfilled in the name of commercial discipline. The tariff consequences of revenue reform should be tested for regressive effects before introduction, connecting to the protections of objective 9. Ensure the requirements are also proportionate to grid company size, since frameworks calibrated for large companies can overburden small distribution companies and cooperatives.