Why this recommendation matters
Existing infrastructure often carries substantial unused headroom. Lines and transformers are rated on static assumptions that hold only for the hottest, stillest hour of the year; power is not actively steered around bottlenecks, so the grid is run to the limit of its most constrained element; and security limits are set preventively, holding flows below what a faster automatic remedy would safely allow. Beyond the wires, dispatchable plants are often locked into inflexible operation by contracts rather than by physics, so generation that could turn down or ramp to accommodate renewables or demand does not.
By reforming utility regulation, grid companies can be steered to leverage a range of solutions that increase grid utilisation. Where returns are earned on capital added to the asset base, grid operators have a structural reason to prefer reinforcement over operational solutions that achieve the same result for less, or that sit on another party’s balance sheet. Aligning these incentives, addressed alongside recommendation 7.2, is the reform that steers operators to use the best options on offer to improve utilisation.
The urgency of such reforms increases as connection queues grow. This is especially true in the many systems where building new grid infrastructure has become slow and expensive, making it ever more important to close the gap between what the grid is currently operated to carry and what it could actually safely carry if operated more efficiently and dynamically.
Extracting more from existing assets is often a rapid intervention that reaches consumers directly. Capacity released from the grid defers or avoids the need for capital-intensive reinforcement, while reduced congestion means less curtailment of cheap renewables and less dispatch of expensive plants in their place. Restructuring inflexible contracts and retrofitting plants for flexible operation also turns the conventional fleet from a source of curtailment into a provider of the system services a high-renewable grid needs. As these measures can be delivered in months to a few years, the clean supply and new demand waiting for grid capacity can connect sooner, provided the released capacity is operated to the same reliability standard as the reinforcement it defers.
How to act on this recommendation
Stage 1
Release the capacity that is already present but unused, and address the contracts that constrain it.
Policymakers and regulators should require the application of dynamic ratings and dynamic operational limits, covering lines, cables and transformers, wherever monitoring and forecasting capabilities permit, and should review existing operational limits and methodologies to identify conservative assumptions that needlessly constrain utilisation. Where the operator holds long-term power purchase agreements that mandate inflexible operation, restructure these agreements so that contracted plants can reduce output, ramp and cycle in response to system conditions. This can be an important method of avoiding curtailment in systems with substantial contracted thermal capacity.
Stage 2
Align incentives, deploy active tools and upgrade existing infrastructure.
Policymakers and regulators should establish performance-based incentives that reward operators for increasing asset utilisation and reducing congestion rather than simply for capital spending. They should mandate or incentivise grid-enhancing technologies for power flow control and topology optimisation, supported by advanced analytics and assessed within planning and investment approval. Upgrade existing lines within their current corridors through reconductoring with advanced conductors, voltage uprating and sectionalisation. This can substantially raise transfer capacity with limited additional permitting and connects to the evaluation of alternatives under recommendation 1.3 and the proportionate permitting in recommendation 3.1. Operators should adopt predictive maintenance, using asset condition data and analytics to prioritise intervention and avoid unplanned outages. Selected dispatchable plants can be retrofitted for flexible operation in the context of a broader transition plan for a thermal generation fleet.
Stage 3
Move from preventive to curative management of constraints.
Operators should adopt curative congestion management, in which higher pre-fault flows are permitted because a fast, reliable automatic remedy is available after the fault. The enabling instruments are special protection and intertrip schemes that disconnect or de-load generation within milliseconds of a defined fault, and storage operated as a grid asset at strategic points in the grid, absorbing or injecting power for the period needed to bring slower measures into effect. Both require the regulatory treatment that permits operators to hold or contract such capability and recover its cost (see recommendation 7.2). The complementary route to congestion relief – activating demand response, storage and distributed flexibility through markets – is addressed under objective 6 and should be read alongside this.
Core measures
Implementation considerations
The central implementation challenge is financial rather than technical. Where regulation rewards capital expenditure through a return on the asset base, operators have a structural reason to prefer reinforcement over operational solutions that deliver the same result for less, so aligning incentives is the central task, one shared with recommendation 7.2. Operators may also be cautious about higher utilisation where it appears to raise operational risk or to demand capabilities they do not hold, which is why these measures must be paired with the visibility, standards and skills built elsewhere in this objective and in objective 8. A specific and well-documented barrier is data access, since technology providers cannot demonstrate the benefits of grid-enhancing technologies without operational data that incumbents control, so transparent data access is part of unlocking the market. Restructuring contracts and retrofitting plant raise their own difficulties. Power purchase agreements are legal instruments with counterparties whose commercial position depends on the terms as written, so restructuring generally requires compensation, renegotiation leverage or a regulatory route. Flexibility retrofits to incumbent generators impose real costs on plant owners through additional wear, more frequent starts and reduced efficiency at lower loads, so cost recovery and the treatment of those costs must be settled before the requirement is imposed. Any such efforts should also be embedded in a broader transition plan for an existing thermal fleet (e.g. repurpose, reserve, retire).
Equity considerations centre on the uneven application of reforms. The benefits of higher utilisation tend to accrue first in regions with stronger infrastructure, higher demand growth or more advanced digital capabilities, so transparent methodologies and fair cost allocation are needed to ensure the savings from avoided investment are shared across regions and consumer groups rather than captured where conditions are already favourable. Reconductoring and uprating deserve particular attention here, since they can raise capacity in existing corridors serving areas that new construction would reach last.