Operate

6.1 Broaden participation 

Flexibility can only be drawn from resources that are allowed to participate. In most systems, the rules governing who may provide balancing, system services and demand response were written for large generators. Most other resources are excluded in practice by prequalification restrictions, minimum bid sizes and baselines, penalties or the absence of an aggregation route. This recommendation calls for participation to be opened to all capable resources on equal terms, whatever the market structure. This action is front-loaded by design since access is the precondition for the other work under this objective.

Why this recommendation matters

Participation frameworks have not kept pace with the resource base. Energy scheduling and balancing and system service arrangements in most systems assume the provider is a power plant: large, metered at high resolution, dispatchable against a generation schedule, and able to carry substantial penalties. Demand response, storage and distributed energy resources fail these assumptions in predictable ways. Their baselines are consumption patterns rather than output curves, their response profiles differ, their unit sizes are smaller, and their forecasting uncertainty is different. Storage typically has the worst fit of all, since many frameworks cannot classify an asset that both draws and injects power, and often charge it grid fees twice for doing so. 

The consequence is a resource base that is technically capable but practically excluded. Storage and demand response resources have no way to offer their flexibility. Small assets have no route to market where aggregation is not a recognised role, or where the rules governing the relationship between an

aggregator and a customer’s supplier are unresolved, which is the question that most often blocks independent aggregation. Fiscal rules and levies frequently impose undue costs on the provision of flexibility. Cumulatively these barriers exclude significant amounts of flexibility the system could draw on.

Opening up participation is high-value, low-cost reform. Jurisdictions that have opened their frameworks have done so by recognising aggregation as a market role, adapting participation parameters to evolving resource characteristics, and requiring that eligibility depend on the service a resource can deliver rather than on what kind of asset it is. The principle extends beyond market systems. In single-buyer and vertically integrated structures, the equivalent is non-discriminatory access to utility programmes and operator procurement, and, where third parties supply flexibility across the grid, open access and wheeling.

How to act on this recommendation

Core measures

Implementation considerations

Stakeholder interests largely align on unlocking new value, but diverge on who captures it. Aggregators, owners of distributed energy resources and flexible consumers gain revenue, while incumbent suppliers and balance-responsible parties often resist independent aggregation because it changes their balancing positions and reaches into their customer relationships. This typically makes the rules on transfer of energy and imbalance settlement the most contested design choice in the aggregation framework, and they should be settled explicitly rather than left to negotiation. A second tension sits with the distribution system operator, which needs visibility of aggregated activity and in defined situations control over it to keep its grid secure, while aggregators need commercial freedom; neutral rules and governed data access reconcile the two. Penalty regimes involve a genuine balance: set for generator-grade certainty, they can exclude some of the new resources; set too loose, they undermine the operator’s confidence in those new resources, which is why participation reform should move with the qualification requirements in recommendation 4.1 and the observability in recommendation 5.2. In single-buyer and vertically integrated systems the same conflicts appear within the utility, and access means transparent eligibility for programmes and procurement, with open-access and wheeling charges that reflect cost. 

Equity considerations centre on the risk of a two-tier system in which larger, wealthier or better-advised actors capture the value of flexibility while smaller and lower-income consumers are left out. Frameworks should make participation accessible to households, community energy schemes and small businesses through simple opt-in aggregation, third-party management and automation by default, so that participation does not require expertise or constant attention. Consumer protection is the counterpart to accessibility: the automated control of domestic assets, the transparency of compensation, and the privacy and cybersecurity of the data involved all affect how much people trust the system, particularly where the assets of vulnerable consumers are managed remotely. This draws on the data governance in recommendation 7.3 and the inclusive-access and protection work in objective 9.