Why this recommendation matters
Financing is increasingly a binding constraint on the pace of grid deployment. As the need for grid investment rises, many grid companies struggle to raise the required capital, which ultimately results in congestion, connection delays and slower clean energy deployment and electrification. The problem is not primarily a general shortage of capital – institutional investors hold large pools of long-term capital, and grids can be attractive assets where revenue is visible and risk is credibly allocated. The difficulty is that many grid companies, especially distribution and municipal utilities and those in fiscally constrained settings, are not sufficiently creditworthy, or do not operate within a framework that converts system need into investable propositions. For some, particularly in emerging economies, the challenge is financial viability: whether tariffs recover costs and revenue is collected. For others, it is the adequacy and predictability of regulated returns.
The financial standing of grid companies should be strengthened and a wider range of capital mobilised. This begins with restoring the financial viability of utilities where revenues do not currently cover efficient costs, strengthening companies’ balance sheets and equity base so that they can undertake higher levels of investment without losing credit quality, setting adequate and predictable regulated returns over multi-year periods, and opening access to a broader range of finance, including green finance and, where domestic capital is scarce, multilateral and bilateral development finance.
Making finance available on acceptable terms once a project is ready removes the constraint that most often stalls otherwise deliverable investment.
A stronger financial position and credible revenue framework lower the weighted average cost of capital. Because that cost is recovered from consumers, reducing it lowers what they need to pay, and it avoids the grid constraints that would otherwise lead to curtailment and congestion. Timely access to capital keeps approved projects moving, so that the grid does not become the reason new supply and demand wait to connect. A well-designed regulatory framework and favourable financing conditions matter for fairness, since they allow weaker utilities and underserved regions to access capital on acceptable terms and avoid falling further behind, protecting the pace of clean energy expansion and electrification where it is often needed most.
How to act on this recommendation
Stage 1
Put the financial foundations in place for robust utilities, starting with viability.
In many systems, especially in emerging economies, the first task is to secure the financial viability of power utilities. Achieve this with cost-reflective tariffs, lower technical and commercial losses, better payment collection and fully funded subsidies, so that the utility earns enough to be creditworthy. Then address balance sheet weaknesses and strengthen the equity of utilities, particularly smaller and municipal utilities, and define adequate, predictable returns and stable revenue models that keep tariffs fair while making grids bankable. How returns are structured to reward efficient outcomes is taken up in recommendation 7.2. Where domestic capital or creditworthiness is limited, blended finance and de-risking instruments can be mobilised.
Stage 2
Broaden and stabilise the sector’s capital base.
Enable green finance instruments such as green bonds by ensuring that grid modernisation is eligible under the relevant taxonomies and standards, establish multi-year regulatory periods that give revenue and investment certainty and allow recovery of anticipatory investment, and, in emerging and developing economies, channel multilateral and bilateral development finance into grid programmes. To widen the pool of investable projects, also support project standardisation and bundling, which packages smaller investments into portfolios that reach the scale institutional investors require. Multi-year certainty reinforces the credibility of the long-term pipelines that supply chains depend on, addressed in recommendation 3.3, and of the anticipatory investment set out in recommendation 1.2. Performance- and TOTEX-based revenue regulation, which ensure that investment is well targeted, is addressed under recommendation 7.2.
Stage 3
Where it can lower cost or speed delivery, bring in third-party investment and other innovative ownership and financing models
Where it can lower cost or speed delivery, bring in third-party investment and other innovative ownership and financing models for selected grid assets, through competitive tenders or regulated third-party ownership. Pilots can be used to test outcomes, within a limited and well-defined scope, and scale up as planning, revenue and regulatory frameworks mature.
Core measures
Implementation considerations
To free up the flow of capital into grid expansion, financing reform has to realign the interests of utilities, their owners, regulators, consumers and investors. Grid companies and investors welcome predictable returns and stronger balance sheets, while regulators, consumer advocates and finance ministries weigh those against the effect on bills and public budgets, since the cost of capital is ultimately recovered from consumers or taxpayers. Public sector and municipal owners, common among distribution utilities, may lack the fiscal headroom to inject equity, which is why credit-financed and guarantee-based instruments are often needed. The central design questions are how to strengthen financial standing without rewarding inefficiency, and how to keep returns adequate enough to attract capital without overcompensating monopoly assets.
The equity implications turn on who can raise capital and who ultimately bears the cost. Weaker municipalities and underserved regions risk falling further behind when their utilities cannot finance modernisation on acceptable terms, deepening regional disparities in reliability and access. Financing frameworks should therefore pay explicit attention to smaller and less creditworthy utilities, for example through guarantee frameworks, pooled or development finance and technical assistance, and cost recovery design should consider the effect of grid charges on low-income and fuel-poor households. In emerging and developing economies, concessional and blended finance has a particular role to play in keeping the cost of capital from becoming a barrier to improving the quality and level of energy access. However, in all cases, there is a stakeholder group that pays the costs, whether that is consumers through network charges, citizens through higher tax burdens or shareholders through lower returns.