Why this recommendation matters
Historically system services came bundled with the conventional generation plants that dominated power systems. Whereas recommendation 6.2 is concerned with scheduling the active power balance (long-term, day-ahead, intraday), this recommendation is concerned with system services, which are in plain terms the other operational functions: the correction of the residual active power imbalance in real time through inertia and frequency reserves, alongside other supporting functions such as voltage control, system strength and restoration. While smaller in volume than the scheduling of the active power balance, these services are decisive for system reliability and power quality. The main way system operators performed these operational functions was – and in many places still is – through conventional generation, managing frequency through the governor response and automatic generation control of the synchronous machines and voltage through their excitation systems. Where generation was not utility-owned, grid codes and contract clauses secured the same functions.
As synchronous generators are displaced, system services have to be defined and quantified before new resources can provide them. Because the services arrived as a by-product of conventional generation, many systems have never defined them at all; they exist as technical settings and expected responses rather than as products with specifications and volumes. The growing pool of potential providers – including storage, demand response, aggregated distributed assets and renewable generators – cannot assess what is needed or in what quantity. At the same time operators cannot see what that pool could supply, missing capabilities that can be deployed faster and in a more distributed way, which can in turn support greater resilience. Systems that defined service products decades ago face a narrower version of the same problem.
Those definitions were typically written around the characteristics of conventional generation and understate what newer resources can do, such as the sub-second response of battery storage. New needs are emerging in parallel, driven partly by the displacement of synchronous generation, and require products few systems have defined: inertia, system strength and restoration from inverter-based resources. Distribution-level needs are the least developed of all, with local congestion and voltage products barely existing in most systems.
Falling technology costs offer an opportunity for improved reliability and cost-effectiveness through better system service procurement. A growing pool of resources capable of providing system services means those services can be bought more cheaply, delivered faster and provided more resiliently, if procurement keeps pace with the innovation. Standardised products let diverse resources compete on equal terms. Published flexibility needs assessments with five- to ten-year time horizons tell providers what to build and tell policymakers whether investment is keeping pace. A common delivery lifecycle across services lowers the cost of entry. The boundary between what assets must provide as a condition of connection and what is procured competitively has to be drawn deliberately; requirements set too stringently oblige assets to deliver services that others could provide more capably and at lower cost, while requirements set too loosely raise both the volume of services the system must buy and the cost and complexity of buying them, where a light-touch general requirement would have sufficed.
How to act on this recommendation
Stage 1
Establish what is bought, from whom and through what process.
Regulators, working with system operators, should establish a procurement framework for system services built around a published catalogue of the services procured, assessed for demand-side compatibility and clarifying explicitly, service by service, what is mandated as a condition of connection under recommendation 4.1 and what is procured competitively here. System-level services should be defined as standardised products, with the volumes needed quantified and published so that providers can invest against them. And a generic reservation-activation-verification-settlement framework should apply a lifecycle to every service, so that a provider qualifies into a process rather than ad hoc arrangements.
Stage 2
Extend the same approach to the local level and make providing services investable.
Local-level services procured by distribution system operators should be defined as standardised products with needs quantified by zone, aligned with the system-level products so a resource can serve both. Coordinate procurement across transmission and distribution, with rules on prioritisation, conflict resolution and information exchange that let both buy from the same pool without conflicting dispatch or double counting, connecting to the operational coordination of recommendation 5.2. Establish flexibility remuneration and support mechanisms where activation revenues alone cannot carry the investment, spanning availability and capacity payments, longer-term contracts that give revenue certainty and support for investment in flexibility-capable equipment, designed as transitional instruments where appropriate.
Stage 3
Prepare and procure for the physics of an inverter-dominated system.
Introduce services for the needs that emerge at a high share of inverters, including fast frequency response, synthetic inertia, grid-forming capability, voltage formation, fault-level and system-strength services, and system restoration, so that functions once inherent in synchronous generation plants, including the ability to restart the system, are sourced explicitly from whichever resources can provide them. This connects to the capability requirements of recommendation 4.1, which make equipment able to deliver these services, and to the real-time stability frameworks of recommendation 5.1, which determine when they are called.
Core measures
Implementation considerations
Stakeholder interests in service procurement align on the goal, but can diverge on the design. System operators want reliable services at least cost, providers want predictable, liquid and transparent markets they can invest against, and regulators must guard overall affordability and coherence; the divergence transpires in product design and coordination. Large incumbent generators and well-capitalised storage may press for product definitions and prequalification rules that suit their own assets. Technology-neutral specifications and a merit order independent of provider type are safeguards that allow demand-side and smaller providers to participate. The mandate-versus-procure boundary is contested from opposite sides, with system operators preferring mandated provision that costs them nothing and providers preferring procurement that pays. The recurring tension between standardisation and tailoring is best handled with a small set of standard products reviewed on a defined cadence. Coordination between transmission and distribution procurement touches on institutional authority and is best settled early on, which connects to the governance handled in recommendation 7.2.
Equity considerations follow from the thinness of these markets and from who ultimately pays. Service markets are small by nature, and market power in thin or concentrated markets can be exercised by a few large players, raising costs that fall on consumers. Transparency, market monitoring and proportionate prequalification can mitigate such issues. The cost of services should also be allocated fairly across grid users. Quantifying systems service needs is complex and inexact, particularly for new products such as those related to inertia, and at the distribution level, where it depends on the observability in recommendation 5.2. It is therefore crucial to publish assessments to allow for oversight and joint learning, and to establish predictable revision cycles.