Why this recommendation matters
Digitalisation is changing how power systems are planned and operated. Granular data from meters, sensors and connected assets show operators what the grid is doing and how much more it can carry, supports the coordination of distributed energy resources and enables services that did not previously exist, while the devices generating these data multiply into the millions. The data are commercially valuable and can be personally revealing at the same time. The number of stakeholders involved is also growing: aggregators, service providers, device manufacturers and platform operators all handle power system data and increasingly affect the system’s operation. The same developments that create these opportunities expose consumers, businesses, grid companies and governments to risks that none of them can manage alone.
Where dedicated governance is missing or dated, neither risks nor opportunities are handled well, and market dynamics alone will not close the gap. Private interests in the digital layer do not fully align with the public interest in a system that is both open and secure because data holders have commercial reasons to restrict access or monetise the data they hold, and cybersecurity spending carries costs without revenue. The results follow the incentives. Consumers face privacy risks when behavioural data reveal occupancy and routines, and may be locked out of services because their data is not portable.
New entrants that depend on fair, predictable access to data typically lack the market power to obtain it. Security obligations that stop at the traditional grid company leave connected devices and customer-facing providers – the fastest-growing part of the attack surface – unsecured. Where no clear authority is designated, responsibility falls between energy regulators, data-protection agencies and security services.
The task for policymakers is to establish the governance that digitalisation requires, determining who may access which data, under what conditions and protections, and how cybersecurity is mandated and enforced across a widening set of entities and devices. Policymakers and regulators can look to banking, telecommunications and other digitalised critical sectors where mature practice exists. Leading energy jurisdictions have implemented many of these practices through designated authorities, with requirements proportionate to each entity’s impact on the system and data frameworks that pair consumer rights with standardised access for authorised parties. Nonetheless, this practice does not yet exist in most power systems at the maturity and scale required. Systems building their digital layer now have an advantage over those that have taken a disjointed approach, since governance designed alongside deployment avoids the harmonisation and integration costs that follow fragmentation.
How to act on this recommendation
Stage 1
Lay the institutional and regulatory foundations.
Policymakers should designate competent authorities for energy sector cybersecurity – in coordination with national cybersecurity authorities where appropriate – and for energy data governance. In parallel, they should classify energy sector entities according to their criticality and introduce proportionate baseline cybersecurity obligations, including risk assessments, minimum security controls and incident reporting. They should also establish consumer data rights, define appropriate data access architectures suited to national circumstances, align sector-specific rules with broader data protection frameworks, and put in place foundational arrangements for operational data exchange and cross-border cybersecurity coordination.
Stage 2
Extend obligations and operationalise access.
Progressively extend cybersecurity obligations to aggregators, flexibility providers and other emerging actors as they become operationally significant, while keeping their obligations proportionate to their role. Also strengthen requirements for ongoing security maintenance – including regular patching, vulnerability management, secure-by-design standards for new deployments, and sector-wide threat intelligence sharing and incident coordination. For inverters, chargers and other connected equipment, this connects closely to the equipment standards and grid codes in recommendation 4.1. Data governance should similarly evolve by operationalising large-scale third-party access through standardised application programming interfaces, authentication and consent management, and common data exchange rules. These rules need to define what information is shared, in what format, at what frequency and under what access conditions across transmission grid companies, distribution grid companies, aggregators and other market participants.
Stage 3
Deepen regional cooperation and secure the supply chain.
Ensure governance frameworks support highly digitalised and interconnected electricity systems operating across regional markets. It is essential to deepen cybersecurity capabilities through coordinated cross-border incident response, joint exercises, information-sharing platforms, and stronger supply chain security for critical hardware and software, reflecting increasing system complexity and geopolitical risks. At the same time, update data governance frameworks to enable secure, real-time cross-border data exchange, building on Stage 1 foundations with greater scale, granularity, and speed to support regional flexibility markets, integrated system operations and increasingly dynamic coordination between electricity systems.
Core measures
Implementation considerations
Stakeholder interests in the digital layer diverge over who may use the data and who carries liability when its use causes harm. Consumers, businesses, grid companies and third-party providers all gain from trusted digital systems, but they may have different expectations regarding data access, privacy and security. Grid companies and other data holders may resist broader data sharing because of commercial, operational, or liability concerns, while overly restrictive rules can limit innovation and reduce the ability of new market actors to participate. Policymakers should therefore strike an appropriate balance between openness, privacy protection and cybersecurity, ensuring that data governance supports both innovation and public trust. Cross-border data exchange also runs into data-sovereignty and localisation rules (regulations requiring data to be stored, processed or kept within a particular country or jurisdiction), so any regional arrangements need to be set up in alignment with national data laws. Institutional coordination is equally important. Responsibilities for energy regulation, cybersecurity, data protection and digital governance are often spread across multiple authorities, creating risks of fragmented oversight or inconsistent requirements. Clear institutional mandates, effective coordination mechanisms and regular dialogue between authorities are essential to ensure coherent implementation as electricity systems become increasingly digitalised and interconnected.
Equity considerations centre on who can use the data and who is exposed by it. The benefits of digitalisation depend not only on access to data, but also on the ability to use it effectively. Smaller grid companies, local authorities, new market entrants, and actors in emerging and developing economies may face constraints on technical capacity, financial resources or digital infrastructure that limit their ability to comply with new requirements or benefit from data-driven services. Consumer exposure runs the other way: energy data reveals occupancy, routines and hardship, while vulnerable customers are least equipped to manage consent and most exposed to its misuse, which connects to the protections in objective 9. Policymakers should therefore ensure that governance frameworks remain proportionate, build institutional capacity where needed, as is further taken up under objective 8, and reduce unnecessary barriers to participation while maintaining high standards of privacy and cybersecurity.