The opportunity
The question of incentives now extends from grid companies to all grid users. Regulation has long concentrated on the incentives of grid companies, which decide how the grid or the wider power system is planned, built and operated. A growing share of the assets that shape demand, such as electric vehicles, batteries, heat pumps and rooftop solar, is now owned by other actors than the grid companies, such as households and businesses. How these resources are used will determine the size of demand peaks and how fully the grid is used. That is why it is key to align the incentives these owners face with the needs of the system: rewarding flexible behaviour for the value it provides to the system gives owners a reason to offer it and allows the system to reap the benefits. These incentives can be passed along to grid users through prices and tariffs, or through programmes and contracts where the system needs a fast or guaranteed response.
More sophisticated prices and tariffs are key to enabling the large-scale coordination of grid users. Arrangements such as peak and off-peak tariffs have been used widely to provide basic coordination of grid use. As renewable deployment, electrification and the growth of distributed energy resources accelerate, such arrangements have to become more sophisticated to signal when, and increasingly where, the grid has spare capacity. They must still recover largely fixed grid costs as self-generation and shifting demand change billed volumes, without moving those costs onto customers who cannot respond.
These aims pull against one another. Sharper signals improve utilisation but can raise bills for those unable to respond, while recovering more through fixed charges protects revenue but weakens the signal. Reform that rewards those who can respond and exposes those who cannot risks undermining the social licence for grid modernisation efforts.
The incentives for grid companies need to evolve as well. Where regulation rewards capital spending, grid companies have little reason to choose flexibility, digital solutions or faster connections over conventional reinforcement. Revenue regulation that rewards outcomes, such as faster connections, reliability and the cost-effective use of flexibility, aligns the incentives of grid companies with the evolving system needs. A key provision to ensure that grid companies make use of the widening resource base is to isolate system operation from other grid company activities, such as generation or retail, so that it treats all resources equally. Grid user signals and grid company incentives need to move together: price signals ask users to shift demand, and grid companies make use of that response only where regulation rewards them for it. The end-state is a grid where prices reflect time, location and grid impact, flexibility is rewarded for the value it provides, and grid companies earn their returns by delivering outcomes.
How to leverage this opportunity
Prices and tariffs shape long-lived investment in grid-connected assets, such as vehicles, heating and cooling, and industrial equipment, so reform is best started early. Aligned incentives depend on the metering and data of a digital grid, equipment that can act on signals, and the participation frameworks of a flexible and distributed grid. In turn, they determine whether those capabilities are used.
Stage 1
Send the first signals, protect those exposed and set the institutional basis.
Introduce time-variable energy and grid tariffs, expose large users to dynamic signals and establish programmes for large flexible loads. Set transparent methodologies for allocating grid and connection costs, and protect vulnerable customers through targeted measures. Where grid companies cannot recover their costs, restore financial viability. Establish an independent regulator, assign each power system function to a specific entity and give grid companies transition mandates.
Stage 2
Extend signals and reward grid companies for outcomes
Offer opt-in dynamic tariffs, remunerate flexibility, and make sure customers who cannot participate are not penalised. Reward connections in parts of the grid with spare capacity. Introduce output- and performance-based revenue regulation with TOTEX treatment and multi-year periods, supported by performance reporting and transparent tariff-setting.
Stage 3
Price by location and complete grid company regulatory reform.
Introduce locational signals with safeguards against adverse distributional effects, embed innovation incentives in revenue regulation, and insulate system operation from commercial conflicts of interest.